Stop the Drain of Defense Dollars: What You Can Do

Stop the Drain of Defense Dollars

Defense spending is in serious need of reform, both in how and what we buy. For the most part, increasing discipline in weapons spending doesn’t require new rules. Rather, better enforcement of the rules that currently exist is needed, especially as they relate to testing and evaluation and hard-nosed assessments of whether critical technologies are ready early in a weapons acquisition. Over-reliance on too many immature technologies critical to the success of a weapon is usually the key reason weapons are delivered billions of dollars over their original cost estimates and years late. At key decision-points known as “Milestones,” where a major weapons program advances from technology validation (Milestone A) to full-scale development (Milestone B) to production (Milestone C), the Pentagon often does not exercise tough oversight or make hard decisions. With the likelihood that Defense Secretary Robert Gates will depart later this year, we may lose a high-level advocate for better accountability within the Pentagon’s weapons portfolio. Despite some reforms over the last few years, the Defense Department still struggles with a variety of weapons programs that face complicated technical challenges and cost and schedule growth, such as the estimated $384 billion Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program (particularly the F-35B model) and the $14.4 billion Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). Other issues arise, such as whether some of these large weapons programs even make sense given the likely set of threats the U.S. is to face in the short and medium term. Some weapons also may be less effective, yet cost far more, than some current weapons in the inventory.

There are deeply entrenched problems within the military-industrial bureaucracy; however, often the biggest obstacle to achieving reform is Congress when lawmakers become overly concerned with parochial interests rather than national security. While many of POGO’s recommendations are geared towards generating greater discipline in the military-industrial complex, Congress needs to exercise greater discipline as well.

POGO Recommendations:

• Emphasize Role of Testing and Evaluation: As prescribed by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, DoD should not allow weapon systems programs to ramp up production until critical technologies to fielding them have been proven through sufficient developmental testing and independent operational test and evaluation. Congress should confer with GAO, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and cognizant developmental test organizations to determine which programs have too much concurrency between development, testing, and production. When too much concurrency is present, Congress should hold funding of programs until they are restructured with less concurrency. The Pentagon should successfully complete realistic prototype testing and evaluation wherever possible, and Congress and GAO should carefully scrutinize any waivers to prototyping. The Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation should be more robustly staffed, report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and make a version of each annual report available to the public.
• Hold DoD Accountable: Often DoD fails to follow its own rules for buying Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) responsibly. Congress should hold it accountable by regularly investigating and holding hearings on acquisitions. Congress, along with the GAO, should scrutinize any proposed waivers to any part of testing or any other required aspect of the acquisition process and should create a requirement that does not allow the Pentagon to proceed to the next Milestone or sign production contracts until Congress has given it explicit statutory approval to bypass any requirement. All waivers should be made public.
• Improve and Better Scrutinize the Business Case for Major Defense Acquisition Programs: Congress should independently evaluate the risks of acquiring overly complex, expensive systems such as the EFV, the Littoral Combat Ship sea frames, and some versions of the JSF, and determine whether those systems undermine more pressing national security priorities. Congress also should require the Pentagon to use the independent Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation’s cost estimates of programs (rather than the generally more optimistic military service cost estimates) when making decisions and putting together budgets.
• Curtail the Systematic Problem of Over-Reliance on Immature Technology: Congress should shift responsibility for Technological Readiness Assessments at Milestones B and C to DoD’s testing community because of concerns that the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is not the most appropriate entity for this mission. Furthermore, programs should prove they have reached a higher level of technological maturity before progressing to the next phase of their acquisition than is currently suggested by the DoD’s July 2009 Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook.
• Make Weapons Programs Auditable: To ensure that taxpayer dollars are effectively used for their intended purpose, Congress should tie weapon systems acquisition to financial management. No new MDAP should pass Milestone B until it has financial systems in place that can capture the full cost of the program in an auditable manner.
• Congressional Ethics Needed When Second-Guessing Pentagon Cancellation of Major Weapons Programs: Once the Pentagon has recommended cancelling an MDAP, Congress can introduce legislation to fund the program anyway. An independent review is needed before Congress can force the Pentagon to buy what it doesn’t want. The review could be conducted by an independent group of experts who do not have financial ties to contractors or the localities that might be impacted by a weapons cancellation—this process can be modeled on the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC). This BRAC-type commission would issue public recommendations to Congress so that if Congress overrules the recommendations, it would have to provide the public with a written explanation of its reasoning. In addition, there also should be formal disclosure by lawmakers of the contractors and subcontractors in their districts and disclosure of congressional correspondence to the Pentagon by lawmakers made on behalf of these companies.

National Security

Our country’s national defense should never take a back seat to private special interests. But too often it does, putting our nation’s servicemen and women at risk, and elevating the agendas of defense contractors ahead of legitimate national security needs. POGO investigates wasteful military spending, the cozy relationship between defense contractors and procurement officials, and malfunctioning weapons systems in order to draw attention to those cases where our national security has been compromised by greed, and in many cases, sheer incompetence. Click on the program areas below to learn more.

A-10 Warthog Aircraft
Despite widespread acclaim by the pilots who fly them, the Air Force brass has repeatedly tried to kill the unglamorous A-10 Warthog program. POGO has and will continue to defend this highly effective and relatively inexpensive aircraft.

B-1 Bomber
Originally conceived in the 1960s as a long-range conventional bomber, the B-1 has been plagued in recent years by a skyrocketing price tag and technical difficulties, while its key requirements have been reduced. The B-1 may no longer be as relevant given its more cost effective alternatives. As the B-1 nears the end of its service life, The Air Force is planning for the integration of next-generation long-range bombers

B-2 Bomber
The most expensive airplane ever built, the B-2 bomber is a perfect example of what the malfunctioning defense acquisition system tends to produce: tremendously expensive and complex weapons in quantities much smaller than originally intended. POGO is also concerned that the B-2’s most distinguishing characteristic, its ability to evade enemy radar, has proven to be unreliable.

Ballistic Missile Defense
Currently the single most expensive weapons system in the Pentagon’s annual budget, the U.S. missile defense program utilizes a questionable acquisition strategy that involves researching, procuring, fielding, testing, and evaluating missile defense assets all at once, making it difficult to ensure that taxpayer dollars are well spent. While POGO does not take a position, pro or con, on missile defense, we believe there needs to be better oversight, testing, and financial accountability in the missile defense program.

Black Hawk Helicopter
Systemic quality control problems at the defense contractor Sikorsky Aircraft have led to defective parts on the Black Hawk helicopter, an aviation workhorse that is prevalent throughout most of the armed services. POGO has argued that Sikorsky should make publicly available the production inspection records for the Black Hawk.

Boeing Tanker Leasing Deal
POGO and its congressional allies uncovered a major Air Force sweetheart deal that would have given Boeing a sole-source leasing contract for tanker aircraft worth tens of billions dollars, much more than it would have cost to simply buy the aircraft. Darleen Druyun, for years the top Air Force procurement official, was discovered to have steered this deal and others to Boeing while negotiating for a higher-paying executive position at the company. Druyun and a top Boeing executive were given prison sentences for attempting to bilk the taxpayer.

C-130J Transport Aircraft
Since its inception in the mid-1990s, the C-130J transport aircraft program has proven to be problematic for U.S. taxpayers. After the Pentagon threatened to cut the program in 2004, the program’s boosters in Congress and Lockheed Martin, the contractor, began a massive disinformation campaign about the alleged need for the aircraft. In 2006, following POGO’s recommendation, the Air Force decided to restructure the C-130J contract, saving taxpayers millions of dollars.

C-17 Airlifter
The C-17 is a four-engine cargo jet designed for intercontinental airlift of large “outsize” payloads to short landing strips in remote areas of the world. In December 2000, the Air Force proposed a possibly illegal arrangement to declare Boeing’s C-17 a “commercial item”--even though the government is the only purchaser of this plane. The result would have been reduced financial oversight of any future Air Force purchases of the cargo plane, and a heavy burden on taxpayers. A few years later, POGO helped to expose a sweetheart deal that would have given Boeing a sole-source leasing contract for the C-17 (see Boeing Leaser Taking Deal).

Comanche Helicopter
Originally conceived in 1983, the requirements for the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter called for a small, lightweight, high performance reconnaissance and attack aircraft. However, to incorporate all these features into a single aircraft, weight had to be added, and new technologies had to be developed because they were either immature or still conceptual in nature. As a result, throughout its history, the Comanche program suffered from dogged funding problems, changing requirements, and wildly unrealistic technological expectations. The Army canceled the Comanche program in 2004, following POGO’s recommendation.

Crusader Howitzer
The Crusader is an armored, mechanized vehicle that was slated to become the Army’s next-generation, 155mm, Self-Propelled Howitzer cannon, supported by a companion ammunition resupply vehicle. POGO recommended canceling the $11.2 billion program after redesign efforts resulted in decreased mission effectiveness. There were also major issues with the Crusader’s development and testing processes. The Crusader was canceled in 2002, in part because it was deemed too heavy to be useful in today’s battles.

CSAR-X
A crucial weapons system requirement for the Air Force’s helicopter replacement program for its combat search and rescue mission, dubbed CSAR-X, was significantly and inappropriately weakened by Air Force program officials to allow Boeing’s Chinook helicopter to compete. Boeing eventually won the CSAR-X contract, worth an estimated $10-15 billion. POGO’s findings indicated that the acquisition process was subverted, and the needs of the warfighter consequently undermined. As a result, the wrong helicopter for the mission may have been procured, possibly putting at risk the men and women in our armed forces who need to be rescued.

Defense Contractor Mergers
POGO has raised serious concerns about defense contractor mergers, which tend to reduce competition, increase the cost of goods and services, and tie the government’s hands when it may want to suspend, debar, or otherwise hold a contractor accountable. POGO believes that the government should not be using taxpayer funds to pay for “restructuring” costs such as merger expenses and executive compensation. Because the merging of defense contractors affects not just defense spending but all federal contracts, you can learn more about this issue in the Contract Oversight section.

Defense and the National Interest Blog
After a ten-year run of analysis, commentary, and discussion, DNI is no longer generating new content. The site is now maintained and preserved for your reading pleasure by the Project On Government Oversight.

FA-22 Fighter Aircraft
Since its conception in 1986, the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor fighter jet has been the focus of continued debate. Problems range from technical flaws (despite 20 years of research and development) to a cost that is higher per aircraft than any other in history. POGO recently opposed a congressional plan authorizing multi-year procurement of the F-22A, especially after it was revealed that the head of a federal research institute which recommended multi-year procurement was holding stocks and stock options in an F-22A subcontractor.

Future Combat Systems
The Army’s 30-year, $160 billion Future Combat Systems (FCS) program will create a modernized system of armored vehicles, robots, and drones connected via a sophisticated battle command network. But the development of FCS has been plagued by major problems, including poor planning of program requirements and unwarranted levels of confidence in unproven technologies. POGO has also raised concerns about the FCS program being acquired under an Other Transactions Authority (OTA) agreement, which means that it is exempt from contracting controls and oversight mechanisms that are typically in place to protect taxpayers from waste and abuse.

Future Combat Systems (FCS) Resources

Growler ITV
The Growler is an updated version of the M151 Jeep that the U.S. military retired in the early 1980s. POGO has found that the Pentagon is wasting taxpayer dollars on the Growler, an unarmed vehicle that is out of place in today’s missions where troops often have to contend with ambushes and roadside bombs.

Intelligence
POGO advocates for stronger oversight and accountability in the intelligence community. In recent years, POGO has supported measures that would grant greater access to congressional intelligence committees and strengthen whistleblower protections for intelligence personnel.

Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is expected to be the largest military aircraft procurement ever, awarded to Lockheed Martin in 2001 for an estimated $300 billion. But POGO has raised concerns that JSF aircraft will be outfitted with risky and unproven technologies. In addition, a recent Pentagon report looking at how Lockheed manages JSF and other programs concluded that the contractor is non-compliant with industry guidelines for tracking and managing costs.

Littoral Combat Ship

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
Due to their heavy armor and V-shaped hull, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) are less susceptible to deadly improvised explosive devices and other types of asymmetric weapons. POGO recently obtained an internal report showing that the Marine Corps "grossly mishandled" requests from Marines in Iraq for more MRAPs, leading to unacceptable delays which have placed U.S. troops at great risk.

Patriot Missile
The Patriot is a surface-to-air missile of central importance to the U.S. Army’s anti-ballistic missile platform. But POGO recently learned that Patriot missiles have been shooting down friendly aircraft in testing as far back as 1993. Even the updated missiles are having problems distinguishing between friendly and enemy aircraft. POGO has criticized the Pentagon for continuing to promote the Patriot despite its knowledge of this serious target discrimination problem.

Predator UAV
The Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is primarily used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition. Many Pentagon officials and reporters have praised the Predator for its successful deployment in Kosovo and Afghanistan. But POGO obtained a Pentagon report which concludes that the Predator is “not operationally effective or suitable” due to serious technical limitations, especially when the aircraft is flying in the rain or at nighttime.

Spare Parts
In the 1980s, POGO worked to expose outrageously overpriced military spending on coffee pots, nuts, and other spare parts. Several years later, the contractor-driven campaign to “re-invent government” removed many of the safeguards that were put in place to keep costs low and protect taxpayers from overspending on spare part items. These acquisition reforms allowed contractors to sell “commercial” items without having to provide cost and price data to prove that their prices are fair. As a result, POGO continues to expose spare part horror stories at the Pentagon.

Stryker Armored Vehicle
The Stryker is an eight-wheeled armored combat vehicle produced by General Dynamics. POGO has raised questions about the decision to move away from more heavily armored vehicles in favor of swifter, more lightly armored vehicles like the Stryker. POGO is also concerned that the vehicle has not been adequately tested. A few years ago, an Army think tank identified several technical problems with the Stryker, such as malfunctioning weapons and computer systems and a vulnerability to rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

V-22 Osprey Aircraft
The V-22 Osprey, a Marine Corps aircraft that takes off like a helicopter and lands like a plane, has been plagued by countless setbacks since it was first introduced more than 25 years ago. Inside sources familiar with the V-22 have informed POGO about problems with downwash, visibility, de-icing, and emergency egress. There have also been questions raised about the lack of adequate testing and evaluation of the aircraft. POGO has called for the cancellation of the V-22, which has been involved in numerous accidents killing both Marines and civilians.

Wasteful Defense Spending
Year after year, the Congress and the Pentagon support big ticket expenditures for weapons systems that do not work, are constantly run way over budget, and are designed to address different threats from a bygone era. Today, there is even greater urgency for canceling the wasteful programs that drain funds from essential national security needs and put our troops at risk. POGO will continue to investigate and challenge billions of dollars in wasteful Pentagon spending on programs that exist primarily to benefit defense contractors.

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